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WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? EXAMINING LEGISLATIVE
AMBIGUITIES IN THE CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2015 AND
THE POTENTIAL FOR A FUTURE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON
INTERPRETATION
Sarah E. Hsu Wilbur*
I. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity attacks are ever-evolving and ever-increasing threats to
companies and individuals alike.1 For example, the recent distributed denialof-service (DDoS) attacks2 that occurred on October 21, 2016, disrupted
service to Spotify, Twitter, PayPal, Netflix, and Amazon, among others.3
The attackers infected “hundreds of thousands of internet-connected
devices” with malicious software—the Mirai botnet—and then used those
devices to attack New Hampshire-based corporation Dyn, Inc., an Internet
infrastructure company and domain name service provider in charge of
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would like to thank Professor Kristin Johnson for sparking my interest in cybersecurity law,
which led me to write this Comment, and for her valuable guidance in writing this Comment.
I would also like to thank my husband, Daniel Wilbur, and my family for their unending love
and support.
1
See, e.g., Fayaz Khaki, The Ever Increasing Cyber Security Challenge, FIN. TIMES
(June 9, 2014, 7:46 AM), http://capgemini.ft.com/secure-information/the-ever-increasingcyber-security-challenge_a-41-362.html.
2
Margaret Rouse & Peter Loshin, Definition: Denial-Of-Service Attack, TECHTARGET
(2007), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/denial-of-service (last updated Dec.
2016) (defining a denial-of-service attack as “a security event that occurs when an attacker
takes action that prevents legitimate users from accessing targeted computer systems, devices
or other network resources” and noting that these types of attacks “typically flood servers,
systems or networks with traffic in order to overwhelm the victim resources and make it
difficult or impossible for legitimate users to use them”).
3
Joseph Menn et al., Cyber attacks disrupt PayPal, Twitter, other sites, REUTERS (Oct.
21, 2016, 9:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-idUSKCN12L1ME; NBC
News, 3rd Cyberattack ‘Has Been Resolved’ After Hours of Major Outages: Company, NBC
NEWS (Oct. 21, 2016, 9:32 AM), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/Major-WebsitesTaken-Down-by-Internet-Attack-397905801.html (last updated Oct. 21, 2016, 6:53 PM). See
also Nate Lanxon et al., The Possible Vendetta Behind the East Coast Web Slowdown,
BLOOMBERG TECH. (Oct. 21, 2016, 9:08 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-10-21/internet-service-disrupted-in-large-parts-of-eastern-u-s (stating that on
October 21, 2016, hackers flooded U.S. servers with phony traffic, causing the servers to crash
and millions of people to lose Internet access to some of the most popular websites in the
world) (last updated Oct. 22, 2016, 1:54 AM).
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redirecting a lot of Internet traffic.4 Referred to as a “stunning breach of
global internet stability,”5 the attack spawned “from millions of internet
addresses, making it one of the largest attacks ever seen.”6 This cyberattack
caused outages in both the United States and Europe.7 Security experts say
the attack was a particularly powerful DDoS attack where the perpetrators
flooded the targets with so much “junk traffic,” causing them to freeze.8
Enacting legislation can help mitigate and prevent cyberattacks by
establishing criminal and/or civil penalties for cyberattacks, by requiring
companies to implement programs to identify potential cybersecurity risks
and threats, and by requiring the government to thoroughly review cyber
laws regularly.9 Information sharing can also help mitigate and prevent
cyberattacks.10 On December 18, 2015, the legislative and executive
branches of the United States government passed the Cybersecurity Act of
4
Menn et al., supra note 3; Symantec Security Response, Mirai: What you need to know
about the botnet behind recent major DDoS attacks, SYMANTEC CORP. (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/mirai-what-you-need-know-about-botnet-behindrecent-major-ddos-attacks (“A distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) on DNS provider
Dyn last week managed to disrupt an array of the internet’s biggest websites, including
Spotify, Twitter, and PayPal. What was most interesting about this attack was that it was
largely carried out using an Internet of Things (IoT) botnet called Mirai[.] . . . Mirai works by
exploiting the weak security on many IoT devices. It operates by continuously scanning for
IoT devices that are accessible over the internet and are protected by factory default or
hardcoded user names and passwords.”).
5
Menn et al., supra note 3.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
See Press Release, Michael F. Nozzolio, What Can Be Done to Prevent Cyber Attacks
in the Future? (July 28, 2015), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/michaelf-nozzolio/what-can-be-done-prevent-cyber-attacks-future. See also Jay P. Kesan & Carol
M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 429, 465, 467–69 (2012) (“Some argue that more stringent criminal laws and
more vigorous enforcement of such criminal laws will deter cyberattacks. However, such an
approach generally requires specific knowledge of the adversary’s identity, which is difficult
in the context of cyberattacks. . . . Having a comprehensive legal structure to address
cybercrime requires many elements, including laws specifying prohibited conduct and
penalties for such conduct, law enforcement with sufficient authority to collect the necessary
electronic evidence, and laws addressing complicated international jurisdictional issues. . . .
Because it is difficult to criminalize cyberattacks and to enforce existing criminal laws, some
commentators have proposed using civil law instead. Resorting to the civil legal system
would enable victims to hold parties liable for behavior that leads to harm. Liability may be
imposed on either the attacker or intermediary parties.”).
10
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE DOD CYBER STRATEGY 3 (Apr.
2015), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyber-strategy/Final_2015_
DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf; Erik M. Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department
of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace and the Attribution Problem, 68 A.F. L.
REV. 167, 185 (2012). See generally Ariana L. Johnson, Note, Cybersecurity for Financial
Institutions: The Integral Role of Information Sharing in Cyber Attack Mitigation, 20 N.C.
BANKING INST. 277 (2016).
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2015 (CSA or the Act)11 with the hopes of mitigating and preventing
cybersecurity attacks like the Dyn DDoS attack.12
The CSA is perhaps “the most significant piece of federal cyber-related
legislation enacted to date.”13 Absent any changes, the CSA will remain in
effect for ten years—until September 30, 2025.14 The CSA, however,
contains some ambiguous language in its text—specifically, the phrases
“unauthorized effort,” “unauthorized access,” “cybersecurity purpose,”
“cybersecurity threat,” “defensive measure,” and “cyber threat indicator”—
related to the concept of authorization.15 These ambiguities resemble
ambiguities in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)16 that are at the
center of an existing circuit split of interpretation regarding the CFAA’s
scope.17
Two ambiguous phrases in the CFAA—”without authorization” and
“exceeds authorized access”—pose interpretive problems for the judiciary
because the concept of “authorization” is not defined in the CFAA.18 As a
result, the conduct prohibited under the CFAA can differ depending on the
jurisdiction because various circuit courts have interpreted the term
“authorization” differently.19 Some courts have interpreted “authorization”
broadly to encompass violations of “corporate computer use restrictions.”20
Other courts have interpreted “authorization” narrowly to exclude computer
misuse and misappropriation.21 Thus, what exactly is or is not authorized
under the CFAA and what constitutes “exceeding authorized access” seems
to depend on the jurisdiction.22
The CSA uses phrases similar to those in the CFAA—”unauthorized
effort” and “unauthorized access”—and also does not define them.
Additionally, the CSA contains the phrases “cybersecurity purpose” and
11
Cybersecurity Act of 2015 §§ 101–407, 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–33 (2015) [hereinafter
CSA], http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/legislation/Cybersecurity-ActOf-2015.pdf.
12
See David J. Bender, Congress Passes the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, NAT’L L. REV.
(Dec. 20, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-passes-cybersecurity-act2015.
13
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, at 1 (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_The_Cybersecurity_Act_
of_2015.pdf.
14
CSA, supra note 11, § 111(a).
15
See infra Part III.A (discussing the ambiguities contained in these phrases).
16
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
17
See infra Part II (discussing this circuit split).
18
See infra Part III (discussing these issues).
19
See infra Part II (discussing these interpretations in detail).
20
Allison D. Burroughs et. al., When is Hacking a Crime? Potential Revisions to the
CFAA, 58 BOSTON BAR J. 13, 14 (Summer 2014).
21
Id. at 15.
22
See infra Part II.
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“cybersecurity threat,” both of which the CSA defines broadly. The CSA
defines “cybersecurity purpose” as the purpose of protecting information and
information systems from cybersecurity threats.23 The CSA defines a
“cybersecurity threat” as anything that “may result in an unauthorized effort
to adversely impact the security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of
[information or information systems.]”24 “Authorization” under the CSA
stems from the broad definitions of “cybersecurity threat” and “cybersecurity
purpose,” which courts could interpret broadly or narrowly, just as with the
CFAA. How courts interpret “authorization” under the CSA is important
because this will effectively determine the scope of what entities can do and
which liability protections they can claim under the CSA.
This Comment examines the CSA and its ambiguous language,
compares this language to relevant portions of the CFAA, and concludes
with recommendations for addressing these concerns. Part II of this
Comment describes the current circuit split that exists among the federal
circuit courts of appeals over the interpretation of “without authorization”
and “exceeds authorized access” under the CFAA,25 and the problems that
this split causes. Part III of this Comment describes Title I, a major part of
the CSA, and its ambiguous language that mirrors similar language in the
CFAA, which, if not amended, could lead to a future circuit split of
interpretation. Part IV of this Comment argues that Congress should amend
the CSA to clarify its legislative ambiguities surrounding the concept of
“authorization” that resemble the troubling phrases in the CFAA, to avoid a
future circuit split of interpretation. Absent any amendments, however, this
Comment contends that courts should interpret the ambiguous language in
the CSA narrowly, following the courts on the narrow interpretation side of
the CFAA circuit split. Part V of this Comment examines a few state-enacted
cybersecurity laws addressing authorization and uses the language of those
statutes to suggest how Congress could amend the CSA’s language.
Ultimately, this Comment argues that Congress should reexamine the CSA
and work on amending its ambiguous phrases by clarifying their meaning
and application, specifically with regard to “authorization” under the Act so
that it can clarify the CSA’s scope and reach of its liability protections, as
well as prevent a future circuit split of interpretation.

23
24
25

CSA, supra note 11, § 102(4).
CSA, supra note 11, § 102(5)(A) (emphasis added).
See infra Part II.
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II. THE EXISTING CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER INTERPRETING THE CONCEPT OF
“AUTHORIZATION” IN THE CFAA
Congress originally enacted the CFAA to address increasing computer
crime and fraud.26 The CFAA creates both civil and criminal liability for its
perpetrators.27 CFAA violations “require an unauthorized access—either an
‘access without authorization’ or an act that ‘exceed[s] authorized access.’”28
Section 1030(a)(2) prohibits a person who “intentionally accesses a
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby
obtains (A) information contained in a financial record of a financial
institution, or of a card issuer[;] . . . (B) information from any department or
agency of the United States; or (C) information from any protected
computer[.]”29 Section 1030(a)(4) prohibits a person who “knowingly and
with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization,
or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the
intended fraud and obtains anything of value[.]”30 At first glance, these two
phrases—”without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access”—seem
simple and straightforward, but they prove “surprisingly hard” to apply to
specific cases.31 Circuit courts have interpreted these phrases differently,
creating disagreement about the scope of “authorization” under the CFAA.

26
See Statutory Interpretation—Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—Ninth Circuit Holds
That Employees’ Unauthorized Use of Accessible Information Did Not Violate the CFAA.—
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) (En Banc), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1454,
1454 (2013) (stating that Congress passed the CFAA in 1986 “to address the growing problem
of intentional trespass into others’ computer files, known as ‘hacking’”); Shawn E. Tuma,
“What Does CFAA Mean and Why Should I Care?”—A Primer on the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act for Civil Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141, 155–56 (2011) (internal citations omitted)
(stating the CFAA’s original purpose was to address increasing hacking and computer crime
directed at government computers, but that “its use has certainly expanded beyond that, both
by Congressional expansion of the statutory language and through application by the
courts”—initially it was just a federal criminal statute, but courts expanded the CFAA “to
permit the recovery of civil damages and injunctive relief for certain of its violations”).
27
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a), (g) (2012); Michael M. Ratoza, Ninth Circuit Expands
Criminal Liability Under Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, BULLIVANT HOUSER BAILEY PC
(May 2011), http://www.bullivant.com/Computer-Fraud-Abuse-Act.
28
Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1561, 1561–62 (2010). See also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF
LEGAL EDUCATION, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 5–12 (Scott Eltringham ed., 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf
(describing how various courts have interpreted the phrases “without authorization” and
“exceeds authorized access,” which have been at issue in a number of cases).
29
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
30
Id. § 1030(a)(4).
31
See Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1154
(2016).
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Some distinction, but not much of a difference, exists between these
two phrases.32 The phrase “without authorization” is not defined in the
CFAA, but “exceeds authorized access” is defined as “to access a computer
with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter[.]”33 What do
these phrases mean exactly? These phrases could mean people who access
a computer they are not allowed to access (i.e., outside hackers) or they could
mean people who access a computer they are allowed to access, but then
access information on that computer that they are not allowed to access (i.e.,
inside hackers). They could also mean something else.
A. The Broad Interpretation of “Authorization” in the CFAA
On one side of the circuit split, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the First,34 Fifth,35 Seventh,36 and Eleventh37 Circuits have interpreted
“exceeds authorized access” broadly38 to include violating the “intended
use” of the authorized access,39 violating business computer use policy
restrictions,40 violating a duty of loyalty imposed under agency law,41 and
violating an employer’s confidentiality agreement.42
In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.,43 the First Circuit found
that a former travel agency employee exceeded authorized access under the
CFAA when he retained a consultant to design a computer program called a
“scraper”44 to gather and analyze pricing information from his former
32

See Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal
citation omitted) (“The difference between ‘without authorization’ and ‘exceeding authorized
access’ is paper thin, . . . but not quite invisible.”).
33
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 28 (discussing
the meaning of the phrases “without authorization” and “exceeding authorized access” by
citing to cases that have interpreted these phrases).
34
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
35
United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
36
Citrin, 440 F.3d 418.
37
United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
38
See Stephanie Greene & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Exceeding Authorized Access in
the Workplace: Prosecuting Disloyal Conduct Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 50
AM. BUS. L.J. 281, 293–99 (2013).
39
See John, 597 F.3d at 271–72.
40
See Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1260, 1263.
41
Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420.
42
See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 583–84 (1st Cir. 2001).
43
274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
44
Explorica, 274 F.3d at 579 (“The scraper has been likened to a ‘robot,’ a tool that is
extensively used on the Internet. . . . Like a robot, the scraper sought information through the
Internet. Unlike other robots, however, the scraper focused solely on [defendant’s] website,
using information that other robots would not have. Specifically, [defendant] utilized tour
codes whose significance was not readily understandable to the public. With the tour codes,
the scraper accessed [defendant’s] website repeatedly and easily obtained pricing information
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employer’s public website, which he then used to gain a pricing advantage
over his former employer.45 More specifically, although the former
employee was authorized to use the employer’s website, he exceeded this
authorization by using his inside knowledge and information to obtain
information, in an attempt to undercut his former employer, that the general
public could not access.46
The Explorica court noted that prior to leaving his employer to start a
competing travel agency business, the employee voluntarily entered a
confidentiality agreement with his employer that prohibited him from
disclosing any information that could reasonably be construed as contrary to
his employer’s interests.47 The court found that this employment agreement
could determine the boundaries of “authorized” access and held that the
employee exceeded authorized access because he obtained confidential
information—i.e., inside knowledge about pricing and tour codes—as an
employee and then used that information for an illicit purpose in violation of
the employment agreement.48 The court thus affirmed the District Court’s
finding that the employee likely violated the CFAA by exceeding
authorization given to him by his employer.49
The Seventh Circuit in International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin50
took a slightly different approach to “authorization” under the CFAA,
holding that an employee’s “authorization” terminates when he or she
engages in misconduct that violates the “duty of loyalty that agency law
imposes on an employee.”51 In other words, when an employee acts
adversely to his or her employer’s interest, this breach of the duty of loyalty
terminates the employer-employee agency relationship, which thus
terminates the employee’s authorization “because the only basis of his [or
her] authority had been that [agency] relationship.”52
The Fifth Circuit held in United States v. John53 that “exceeds
authorized access” under the CFAA means going beyond the “intended use”
of a system for which one’s access was authorized.54 In John, a Citigroup
employee accessed confidential client account information that she was
authorized to access, but then provided that information to someone who
for those specific tours.”).
45
Id. at 579–80, 583–84.
46
Id. at 583–84.
47
Id. at 582.
48
Id. at 581–84.
49
Id. at 585.
50
440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
51
Id. at 420.
52
Id. at 420–21.
53
597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
54
Id. at 271–72.
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used it to incur fraudulent charges.55 The employee was obviously
authorized to obtain certain confidential information because of where she
worked, but she could only use that information for specific purposes, not
however she wanted to, and especially not for illegal purposes.56 Simply put,
just because one is authorized to access confidential information does not
give one the right to use that information for criminal purposes or for any
purpose other than what is permitted.57 The John majority concluded that
authorized access under the CFAA can include limitations on use of
information taken by persons who are permitted to access a system or a
system’s data “when the user knows or reasonably should know that he or
she is not authorized to access a computer,”58 and when the information is
obtained to further or perpetrate a crime.59
The Eleventh Circuit similarly held in United States v. Rodriguez60 that
a Social Security Administration employee exceeded authorized access
under the CFAA when he used his access to a federal database for nonbusiness purposes, which was against the employer’s policy.61 Specifically,
the employee abused his access to obtain personal identifying information of
his former girlfriends and other women.62 Though the information was not
used for an illegal purpose (unlike in John), the Rodriguez court held that the
employee exceeded authorized access under the CFAA when he acquired
personal information for a non-business purpose, which violated his
employer’s policy that restricted him to accessing the database for business
purposes only.63
B. The Narrow Interpretation of “Authorization” in the CFAA
On the other side of the split, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Second,64 Fourth,65 and Ninth66 Circuits have adopted a narrower view
of “exceeds authorized access,” positing that this phrase should be limited to
perpetrators who get information they are not allowed to access on a
computer that they are otherwise permitted to use.67 In other words,
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 269.
Id. at 272.
See id.
Id. at 271.
John, 597 F.3d at 271.
628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1263.
United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015).
WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).
See id. at 863–64.
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“‘exceeds authorized access’ in the CFAA does not extend to violations of
use restrictions,” but rather applies to violations of access restrictions.68
In WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller,69 the Fourth Circuit
held that a person exceeds authorized access under the CFAA when he or
she “accesses a computer without permission or obtains or alters information
on a computer beyond that which he [or she] is authorized to access.”70
Miller involved an employee who downloaded certain confidential
information that he was permitted to access, resigned from the company, and
then presented the downloaded information to his former employer’s
competitor to gain the competitor’s business.71 The Miller court held that
though the employee may have misappropriated information, he did not
exceed authorized access under the CFAA because he did not hack into the
employer’s system nor did he obtain information that he was not authorized
to get.72 The court seemed to indicate that misappropriating information
could be grounds for reprimand and/or termination, but does not constitute a
CFAA violation because the CFAA is more concerned with preventing
people from getting information they are not permitted to obtain.73
In a similar vein, the Second Circuit in United States v. Valle74 held that
“exceeds authorized access” means exceeding “the parameters of authorized
access” by using a computer that one has permission to use, but entering a
part of that computer where he or she is not allowed to go.75 Valle involved
a New York City police officer who actively participated in an Internet sex
obsession community where he talked with other users about kidnapping,
torturing, cooking, and even cannibalizing various women, though he
apparently never acted on those elaborate plans.76 While the officer’s acts
were undoubtedly disturbing to say the least, the issue was whether he

68

Id. at 863.
687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
70
Id. at 206.
71
Id. at 202.
72
See id. at 206–07.
73
See id. at 207 (“[W]e agree with the district court that although Miller and Kelley may
have misappropriated information, they did not access a computer without authorization or
exceed their authorized access. . . . Our conclusion here likely will disappoint employers
hoping for a means to rein in rogue employees. But we are unwilling to contravene Congress’s
intent by transforming a statute meant to target hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability to
workers who access computers or information in bad faith, or who disregard a use policy. . . .
[W]e reject an interpretation of the CFAA that imposes liability on employees who violate a
use policy, choosing instead to limit such liability to individuals who access computers
without authorization or who obtain or alter information beyond the bounds of their authorized
access.”).
74
807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015).
75
Id. at 524.
76
Id. at 512.
69
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exceeded authorized access on his work computer to live out his fantasy.77
The officer admitted he violated his employment terms, but argued that he
did not exceed authorized access under the CFAA because he was authorized
to obtain the information he accessed in the law enforcement search
database.78 The government, on the other hand, argued the officer did exceed
authorized access because he obtained information for a non-law
enforcement purpose from a database that was dedicated solely to law
enforcement purposes.79
The Valle court reasoned that to hold the officer liable here would
expose millions of unsuspecting individuals to potential criminal liability.80
The Valle court first examined the CFAA’s text, purpose, and legislative
history,81 and concluded it supported both broad and narrow interpretations
of the CFAA.82 Specifically, the Valle majority found that courts could
interpret “exceeds authorized access” to mean one of two things: (1)
someone who is allowed to access a computer and does so with an
inappropriate purpose or to get or modify information; or (2) someone who
is allowed to access a computer and does so to get or modify information
that he or she is not allowed to acquire for any purpose.83 Because this

77

Id. at 511–12.
Id. at 523.
79
Id. at 524.
80
Valle, 807 F.3d at 527. See also WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d
199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e are unwilling to contravene Congress’s intent by transforming
a statute meant to target hackers into a vehicle for imputing liability to workers who access
computers or information in bad faith, or who disregard a use policy. . . . Thus, we reject an
interpretation of the CFAA that imposes liability on employees who violate a use policy,
choosing instead to limit such liability to individuals who access computers without
authorization or who obtain or alter information beyond the bounds of their authorized
access.”).
81
See Valle, 807 F.3d at 525 (internal citations omitted) (“Congress enacted the CFAA
in 1984 to address ‘computer crime,’ which was then principally understood as ‘hacking’ or
trespassing into computer systems or data. . . . The Senate Committee Report to the 1986
amendments specifically described ‘exceeds authorized access’ in terms of trespassing into
computer systems or files. In heightening the mens rea requirement for section 1030(a)(2),
the Committee explained that it did not want to hold liable those ‘who inadvertently “stumble
into” someone else’s computer file or computer data,’ which was ‘particularly true in those
cases where an individual is authorized to sign onto and use a particular computer, but
subsequently exceeds his authorized access by mistakenly entering another computer or data
file that happens to be accessible from the same terminal.’ . . . Congress was also careful to
note that ‘section 1030 deals with an “unauthorized access” concept of computer fraud rather
than the mere use of a computer. Thus, the conduct prohibited is analogous to that of
“breaking and entering.”‘“ . . . Consequently, the legislative history consistently characterizes
the evil to be remedied—computer crime—as ‘trespass’ into computer systems or data, and
correspondingly describes ‘authorization’ in terms of the portion of the computer’s data to
which one’s access rights extend.”).
82
Id. at 511–12.
83
Id. at 523–24.
78
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ambiguous language lent itself to both interpretations, the Valle majority
applied the rule of lenity and adopted the narrower construction in favor of
the defendant.84 In short, the rule of lenity states that where courts can only
guess as to an ambiguous criminal law’s legislative intent, courts should
interpret that law in favor of the defendant.85 This rule ensures that people
will have fair notice of what is a crime.86
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Nosal87 that
“exceeding authorized access” does not apply to those who violate use
restrictions and does not include computer misappropriation or misuse,88 but
rather is limited to those who violate “restrictions on access to
information.”89 Nosal involved a former employee who left his executive
search firm employer to create a competing business.90 He persuaded his
former coworkers to use their employee computer access to download
confidential information from the employer.91 The issue was whether the
former employee, intending to defraud, helped his former coworkers exceed
their authorized access in violation of CFAA’s section 1030(a)(4).92 The
former employee argued that “exceeds authorized access” applied to hackers
84
Id. at 523. See also Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2209 (2013) (internal
citations omitted) (“[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure,
history, and purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such
that the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended. . . . Only where ‘the language
or history of [the statute] is uncertain’ after looking to ‘the particular statutory language, . . .
the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy,’ does the rule of lenity serve
to give further guidance. . . . ‘The rule [of lenity] comes into operation at the end of the
process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.’”); United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514
(2008) (“The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the
defendants subjected to them.”).
85
See supra note 84; Valle, 807 F.3d at 526–27.
86
Valle, 807 F.3d at 526–27. See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)
(stating that a criminal statute violates the constitutional requirement of definiteness when it
“fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute,” because people should not be held criminally liable for actions that
they “could not reasonably understand to be proscribed”); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[T]he terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render
them liable to its penalties is a well-recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary
notions of fair play and the settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of
law.”).
87
676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012).
88
Id. at 863 (following the reasoning of other courts who recognized that the CFAA’s
plain language did not include computer misuse or misappropriation).
89
Id. at 863–64.
90
Id. at 856.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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and not to people who misused information they were allowed to access.93
The government, however, argued that “exceeds authorized access” included
employees who violate restrictions on use of information that they are
authorized to access, even if they lack culpable intent.94 The Nosal court
declined to adopt the broad interpretation because like the Valle court, it
reasoned that criminalizing computer misappropriation or misuse95 would
have far-reaching effects on millions of people.96 The court held that
“exceeds authorized access” does not mean violating use restrictions, but
rather, “is limited to violations of restrictions on access to information.”97
The Nosal majority noted that the narrower interpretation of “exceeds
authorized access” made more sense considering the legislative history and
text of the CFAA, which was enacted to “punish hacking—the
circumvention of technological access barriers—not misappropriation of
trade secrets—a subject Congress has dealt with elsewhere,” namely the
federal trade secrets statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1832.98
C. The Problems the CFAA Circuit Split Creates
Inconsistent interpretations of the CFAA are “highly problematic
because they can induce noncompliance with congressional intent, displace
the common law, abuse federal jurisdiction, and violate the rule of lenity.”99
The current circuit split prevents judges from establishing a congruent body
of law regarding the scope of the CFAA as it relates to authorization.100
Furthermore, the circuit split creates problems for individuals.101 America
93

Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
Id. at 857–59.
95
Such misappropriation or misuse could include minor violations like checking
Facebook or playing solitaire on one’s work computer, which are things that many people do,
yet are things the CFAA was not enacted to criminalize. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859–60
(“While ignorance of the law is no excuse, we can properly be skeptical as to whether
Congress, in 1984, meant to criminalize conduct beyond that which is inherently wrongful,
such as breaking into a computer. . . . Minds have wandered since the beginning of time and
the computer gives employees new ways to procrastinate, by g-chatting with friends, playing
games, shopping or watching sports highlights. Such activities are routinely prohibited by
many computer-use policies, although employees are seldom disciplined for occasional use
of work computers for personal purposes. Nevertheless, under the broad interpretation of the
CFAA, such minor dalliances would become federal crimes.”).
96
Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859, 862. For example, though things like checking Facebook or
playing solitaire while at work may be against company policy and could be grounds for
reprimand or termination, it does not seem fair to hold a person criminally, or even civilly,
liable under the CFAA for such harmless conduct.
97
Id. at 864.
98
Id. at 863.
99
Myra F. Din, Note, Breaching and Entering: When Data Scraping Should Be a
Federal Computer Hacking Crime, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 405, 424 (2015).
100
Id.
101
See id.
94
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was founded on notions of due process and fair notice. Individuals should
have notice that what they are doing is a crime and should not have to guess
that something may or may not be a crime based on what jurisdiction they
are in, given that various jurisdictions could interpret the same law
differently.102 The broad interpretation of authorization in the CFAA does
not give fair notice to individuals of potential criminal conduct because it
could encompass both serious and benign actions.103 Thus, the narrower
interpretation is the fairer and more logical interpretation.
Discerning the meaning of a particular law is often very challenging.104
In recent decades, legislation has leaned toward combining both specificity
and ambiguity.105 Courts struggle to determine legislative intent and the
meaning of ambiguous language and congressional inaction.106 Sometimes

102
See Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Blaine H. Evanson, The Enduring and Universal
Principle of “Fair Notice”, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2013) (“The fair notice
requirement is an essential protection of the due process clause, and shields all defendants
from unfair and arbitrary punishment. . . . The [Supreme] Court has traditionally analyzed fair
notice challenges to criminal statutes under the ‘void-for-vagueness’ doctrine.”); Stacy
Nowicki, No Free Lunch (or Wi-Fi): Michigan’s Unconstitutional Computer Crime Statute,
2009 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 13–14 (2009) (“The void for vagueness doctrine challenges the
language of a law as unconstitutional. It originates in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments[.] . . . A statute that does not clearly define forbidden behavior
violates due process because it does not give the public notice of what activities are prohibited,
and law enforcement can enforce the law in an arbitrary and discriminatory way. The void
for vagueness doctrine requires that statutes contain clear, precise language so they ‘give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that
he may act accordingly.’”); Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds
of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 356 (2005) (“The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment require a criminal statute to be declared void
when it is ‘so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.’ This void-for-vagueness doctrine ‘forbids wholesale
legislative delegation of lawmaking authority to the courts’ and ‘requires that . . . ordinarily
legislative crime definition be meaningfully precise—or at least that it not be meaninglessly
indefinite.’”) (internal citations omitted).
103
United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 527 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Nosal, 676
F.3d 854, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[Broad] construction of the [CFAA] would expand its
scope far beyond computer hacking to criminalize any unauthorized use of information
obtained from a computer. This would make criminals of large groups of people who would
have little reason to suspect they are committing a federal crime. While ignorance of the law
is no excuse, we can properly be skeptical as to whether Congress, [in enacting the CFAA] in
1984, meant to criminalize conduct beyond that which is inherently wrongful, such as
breaking into a computer. . . . Significant notice problems arise if we allow criminal liability
to turn on the vagaries of private policies that are lengthy, opaque, subject to change and
seldom read.”).
104
Robert A. Katzmann, Making Sense of Congressional Intent: Statutory Interpretation
and Welfare Policy, 104 YALE L.J. 2345, 2360 (1995) (book review).
105
Id. at 2348.
106
Melissa W. Rawlinson, Note, United States v. Singleton and the Witness Gratuity
Statute: What Is the Best Approach for the Criminal Justice System?, 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 227,
248 (2000).
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legislators intentionally leave language ambiguous to give government
officials and judges “the responsibility of adding flesh to the statutory
skeleton.”107 Other times ambiguous language exists because that is the price
legislators must pay in order to enact the law through compromise.108 In the
case of the CSA, the latter seems more likely. But even still, Congress
should amend the CSA to clarify some of the ambiguities surrounding the
concept of “authorization” that resemble the troubling phrases in the CFAA.
This Comment promotes the narrow interpretation of “authorization” that the
Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have taken in the existing CFAA circuit
split. Thus, absent a legislative amendment or a Supreme Court ruling to the
contrary, courts should follow the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits’ lead
and similarly interpret “authorization” narrowly as it relates to the CSA. As
discussed in Part III.C., contrary holdings could lead to a similar circuit split
of interpretation of the CSA and could have serious privacy implications.109
III. THE CSA
In the nearly three decades that have passed since Congress enacted the
CFAA, the world has become exceedingly more dependent on computers
and the Internet. President Barack Obama signed the CSA into law on
December 18, 2015.110 The CSA was part of a $1.1 trillion omnibus
107
Katzmann, supra note 104, at 2348. See also Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard,
Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and
Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640 (2002) (“There are several entirely innocent and
socially responsible rationales for certain forms of legislative ambiguity. At one extreme,
Congress might not even recognize that it is creating ambiguity. It might also fail to legislate
with precision because it wishes to avoid cluttering the statutory text with excessive detail.
Apart from aesthetic concerns, Congress may lack the foresight and expertise needed to
specify every last jot and tittle of a rule in the text of the statute, and it could be inefficient for
a legislature even to try. Congress could also rationally decide that a legislative scheme will
work better if discretion is delegated to the courts to resolve disputes according to flexible
standards, even though the resulting flexibility generates foreseeable inconsistency in
application. Legislating through [sic] standards may require ambiguity in the legislative
language to confer that flexibility. Ambiguity can also arise over time as a consequence of
unforeseen technological, economic, or social developments.”).
108
Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, Interbranch Communication: A Note on
“Article III En Banc,” 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 110, 117 (2007). See also Robert A.
Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Statutory Communication Between
Courts and Congress: A Progress Report, 85 GEO. L.J. 2189, 2197 (1997) (“Ambiguity can
be inadvertent or deliberate (perhaps as a means of securing a majority coalition to enact the
law).”); Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for “Statutory
Housekeeping”: Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 131,
141 (2007) (stating that courts understand that legislative ambiguities are sometimes “the
price of legislative compromise” to ensure a law’s enactment).
109
See infra Part III.C.
110
See David M. Herszenhorn, Congress Passes $1.8 Trillion Spending Measure, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2015, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/us/congress-spendingbill.html.
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spending bill.111 It consists of parts of three previously introduced bills:112
one passed by the Senate—the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of
2015113—and two passed by the House—the Protecting Cyber Networks
Act114 and the National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of
2015115 The CSA was enacted in part to help facilitate the voluntary sharing
of cybersecurity-related information between and among public and private
entities without fear of reprisal.116 A key part of the CSA is Title I, the
111
Mike DeBonis & Kelsey Snell, Here’s what made it into Congress’s big spending and
tax Bills, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
wp/2015/12/16/heres-what-made-it-intocongresss-big-tax-and-spending-bills/.
112
Jasper Tran, Cyberwars: Navigating Responsibilities for the Public and Private
Sector: Navigating the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 483, 483 (2016); Matthew
Gardner & Moshe Broder, CISA: Hope for More Cybersecurity, Challenges in
Implementation and Interpretation, PROCUREMENT LAWYER, Spring 2016, at 19, 20,
http://www.wileyrein.com/media/publication/213_CISA-Hope-for-More-Cybersecurity-Cha
llenges-in-Implementation-and-Interpretation.pdf (“[I]n 2015, the Senate and the House of
Representatives advanced three versions of the bill, before a final combined version was
inserted in late-December 2015 into the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.”); Press Release, Jack
Langer, U.S. House of Representatives, Key Intel Bills Added to Omnibus Legislation (Dec.
16, 2015), http://intelligence.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=461 (“The
Cybersecurity Act of 2015 is similar to the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (H.R. 1560), which
passed the House on April 22 by a vote of 307-116. It also resembles the National
Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, which passed the House by a vote of
355-63, and the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, which passed the Senate by
a vote of 74-21.”).
113
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/754/text.
114
Protecting Cyber Networks Act, H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1560/text.
115
National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act of 2015, H.R. 1731, 114th Cong.
(2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1731.
116
See Joel DeJesus, New Grid Security Measures for 2016, PUB. UTIL. FORTNIGHTLY,
Feb. 2016, at 40, 41–42 (stating the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 “paves the way for more robust
public and private monitoring and protection of information systems” and noting that the
Act’s “liability limits will ensure industries can take these steps to protect their information
systems with limited risk of litigation”); Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, President
Obama Signs Cybersecurity Act of 2015 to Encourage Cybersecurity Information Sharing
(Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/presidentobama-signs-cybersecurity-act-of-2015-to-encourage-cybersecurity-information-sharing
(“[The CSA] provides certain assurances to entities in the private sector to encourage such
sharing [of ‘cyber threat indicators and defensive measures with the federal government’]. In
addition to the protection against public disclosure and the limitations on the federal
government’s use of shared information, the Act’s principal incentive to encourage
information sharing is liability protection for private entities that share information in
accordance with the Act.”); United States House of Representatives, Joint Explanatory
Statement to Accompany the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, at 1 (2015), http://intelligence.
house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/jes%20for%20cybersecurity%20act
%20of%202015.pdf (stating the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 “is designed to create a voluntary
cybersecurity information sharing process that will encourage public and private sector
entities to share cyber threat information, without legal barriers and the threat of unfounded
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Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015.117 Title I has three primary
provisions.118 The first main provision authorizes private entities to
monitor,119 for cybersecurity purposes,120 their information systems and data
on those information systems (and others’ information systems if the private
entities get authorization and written consent).121 Title I’s second main
provision authorizes private entities to implement “defensive measures”122
to protect their rights and property.123 Title I’s third main provision offers
liability protections (including protections against antitrust laws) for private
entities who voluntarily share and receive “cyber threat indicator”124
information with both public and private entities, provided they comply with
the CSA’s requirements. Such compliance includes removing a certain
individual’s personal information or “information that identifies a specific
individual” before sharing it.125 Title I thus permits private entities to
litigation—while protecting private information.”).
117
CSA, supra note 11, §§ 101–11. See also Brad S. Karp, Federal Guidance on the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (Mar. 3, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/
03/03/federal-guidance-on-the-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-of-2015/; Latham &
Watkins LLP, What You Need to Know About the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-Cybersecurity-Act-of-2015 (describing and
summarizing the key provisions of the CSA); Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, supra
note 116 (summarizing the key provisions of the CSA).
118
Karp, supra note 117.
119
See CSA, supra note 11, § 102(13) (defining “monitor” as “to acquire, identify, or
scan, or to possess, information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information
system”).
120
See id. § 102(4)–(5) (defining “cybersecurity purpose” as “the purpose of protecting
an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an
information system from a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability”; and defining
“cybersecurity threat” as “an action, not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, on or through an information system that may result in an unauthorized
effort to adversely impact the security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an
information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information
system.”).
121
Id. § 104(a)(1).
122
See id. § 102(7) (defining “defensive measure” as “an action, device, procedure,
signature, technique, or other measure applied to an information system or information that is
stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates
a known or suspected cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability,” but explicitly “does not
include a measure that destroys, renders unusable, provides unauthorized access to, or
substantially harms an information system or information stored on, processed by, or
transiting such information system not owned by (i) the private entity operating the measure;
or (ii) another entity or Federal entity that is authorized to provide consent and has provided
consent to that private entity for operation of such measure.”).
123
Id. § 104(b)(1).
124
See id. § 102(6) (defining “cyber threat indicator”).
125
CSA, supra note 11, § 106; John P. Carlin, Detect, Disrupt, Deter: A Whole-ofGovernment Approach to National Security Cyber Threats, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 391, 434
(2016) (citing 6 U.S.C. § 1503(d)(2) (2015)). See also U.S. Enacts Cybersecurity Information
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monitor networks, operate “defensive measures” on networks, and share and
receive “cyber threat indicators”—all for “cybersecurity purposes,” i.e., to
protect information systems against cybersecurity attacks.126
The CSA, though, is not without its flaws. Its language contains much
ambiguity and uncertainty.127 As scholar Orin Kerr put it, the CSA’s text
describing what companies can monitor reflects the same struggles and
problems that Congress had in enacting the CFAA—how does one describe
unauthorized conduct that a cybersecurity law can target for surveillance?128
Whereas the CFAA contains the phrases “without authorization” and
“exceeds authorized access,” the CSA contains the phrases “unauthorized
effort” and “unauthorized access.”129 The CSA does not define these critical
phrases that focus on the concept of “authorization,” the same word the
CFAA focuses on.130 Because the CSA embodies legislative ambiguities
similar to those present in the CFAA, this Comment suggests that Congress
should amend the CSA to define these ambiguous phrases and/or include
Sharing Legislation, CSX SPECIAL REPORT (ISACA, Rolling Meadows, Ill.) Jan. 6, 2016, at
1,-http://www.isaca.org/cyber/Documents/CSX-Special-Report_misc_Eng_0116.pdf
(stating the CSA created a framework for both public and private entities to voluntary share
cyber threat information with each other in an effort to defend against cyberattacks, while still
protecting “individuals’ privacy rights by ensuring that personal information is not
unnecessarily divulged”).
126
See CSA, supra note 11, § 104(a)–(c); Kristin N. Johnson, Managing Cyber Risks, 50
GA. L. REV. 547, 578–79 (2016). See also Tran, supra note 112, at 495 (stating the CSA
“contains the majority of CISA’s provisions, but with three notable exceptions: (1) network
operators have monitoring privileges; (2) network operators can operate defensive measures;
and (3) network operators can share cyberthreat information with others”); S. REP. No. 11432,
at
5
(2015),
https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/srpt32/CRPT-114srpt32.pdf
(“Specifically, private entities are only authorized to monitor their own information systems
or those of another private entity upon the authorization and written consent of such other
entity. Moreover, such monitoring is limited to cybersecurity purposes. Essentially, these
important limitations ensure that private entities are only authorized to monitor their
information systems to protect against cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities. Any other
monitoring would require lawful authority other than that provided in this Act.”); Gardner &
Broder, supra note 112, at 20 (noting that Title I of the CSA authorizes private entities to
“monitor their (or their customers’) information systems for ‘cybersecurity purposes,’ operate
defensive measures for cybersecurity purposes on their (or their customers’) networks to
protect their ‘rights or property,’ and voluntarily share and receive certain information”
without fear of liability).
127
Orin Kerr, How Does the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 Change the Internet Surveillance
Laws?, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/12/24/how-does-the-cybersecurity-act-of-2015-change-the-internetsurveillance-laws/.
128
Id. See also Gardner & Broder, supra note 112, at 26 (stating that the CSA allows
private entities “the opportunity to reexamine their information and network security
procedures and engage in information sharing and defensive measures to better protect
information systems from external threats,” but that these opportunities also bring “significant
challenges in interpreting and applying key provisions of [the Act]”).
129
Kerr, supra note 127.
130
Id.
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examples of authorization to clarify the CSA’s scope so that courts can
uniformly interpret the CSA. Interpretation of “authorization” under the
CSA should not be completely left up to individual court interpretation since
this could result in various interpretations and in turn lead to a future circuit
split similar to the one that currently exists with the CFAA.131 This could
also have serious privacy implications because of the broad power the CSA
gives to entities to monitor and surveil computers and information systems,
which could lead to potential future constitutional challenges.132
A. Legislative Ambiguities Within the CSA
The CSA contains ambiguous language that resembles the troublesome
language in the CFAA. First, the CSA uses the ambiguous, undefined
phrases “unauthorized effort” and “unauthorized access,” which are similar
to the problematic phrases in the CFAA.133 “Authorization” is partially
explained but not explicitly defined in Section 104 of the CSA,134 which
gives courts the ability to construe “authorization” broadly. How courts
interpret “authorization” under the CSA is important because this effectively
determines what activities fall within the scope and liability protections of
the CSA. Second, the CSA contains the phrases “cybersecurity purpose” and
“cybersecurity threat,” both of which the CSA defines broadly.135 The CSA
defines “cybersecurity purpose” as the purpose of protecting information and

131

See supra Part II.
Such privacy implications could include allowing the government to collect large
amounts of information that can be used for cybersecurity or non-cybersecurity purposes,
increasing the National Security Agency’s access to personal information, and/or erroneous
receipt or distribution of personal information. See John Heidenreich, Note, The Privacy
Issues Presented by the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 91 N.D. L. REV. 395 (2015);
Press Release, Open Tech. Inst., 55 Civil Society Groups, Security Experts, and Academics
Strongly Oppose Intelligence Committees’ Cybersecurity Information Sharing Bills (Apr. 21,
2015), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/press-releases/55-civil-society-groups-security-expe
rts-and-academics-strongly-oppose-intelligence-committees-cybersecurity-information-shar
ing-bills/. See also Al Franken, Senator, Remarks of Sen. Al Franken on the Cybersecurity
and Information Sharing Act of 2015 (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.fran
ken.senate.gov/?p=news&id=3269 (“The term ‘cybersecurity threat’ is really the lynchpin of
the [CSA]: companies can monitor systems, share cyber threat indicators with one another or
with the government, and deploy defensive measures to protect against any cybersecurity
threats. . . . Under [its broad] definition, companies can take action even if it’s unreasonable
to think that security might be compromised. This raises serious concerns about the scope of
all of the authorities granted by the bill and the privacy implications of those authorities. And
security experts and advocates have warned that, in this context, establishing the broadest
possible definition of ‘cybersecurity threat’ actually threatens to undermine security by
increasing the amount of unreliable information shared with the government.”). A detailed
examination of such privacy implications is beyond the scope of this Comment.
133
See Kerr, supra note 127.
134
See CSA, supra note 11, § 104.
135
Id. § 102(4)–(5).
132
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information systems from “cybersecurity threat[s].”136 The CSA defines a
“cybersecurity threat” as anything that “may result in an unauthorized effort
to adversely impact the security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of
[information or information systems.]”137 Thus, what constitutes a
“cybersecurity purpose” hinges on how broadly courts construe
“cybersecurity threat,” which depends on how courts interpret “unauthorized
effort.” This could be very broad given that the CSA does not define
“unauthorized effort.” To limit the scope of authorization under the CSA,
Congress should amend the CSA to define “unauthorized effort” or give
examples of what constitutes an “unauthorized effort.” Third, and lastly, the
CSA contains the phrases “defensive measure” and “cyber threat indicator,”
both of which the CSA defines.138 The legislative history reveals that
Congress intended for these last two phrases to be narrowly construed, but
their plain language definitions give courts the potential to construe them
broadly.139
The CSA defines a “defensive measure” as “an action, device,
procedure, signature, technique, or other measure applied to an information
system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an
information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.”140 The CSA, however,
explicitly excludes the following from the definition of “defensive
measures”: measures that destroy, render unusable, provide unauthorized
access to, or substantially harm “an information system or information stored
on, processed by, or transiting such information system not owned by (i) the
private entity operating the measure; or (ii) another entity . . . that is
authorized to provide consent and has provided consent to that private entity
for operation of such measure.”141 The legislative history behind this
definition indicates that Congress intended “defensive measure” to be
narrowly construed.142 Legislators gave examples of how simple or complex
a “defensive measure” could be, stating that it could be a simple security
mechanism that restricts access to an entity’s computer infrastructure or it
could be a “sophisticated software tool[] to detect and protect against
anomalous and unauthorized activities on a private entity’s information
system.”143 The legislative history also reveals that Congress intended for

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Id. § 102(4).
CSA, supra note 11, § 102(5) (emphasis added).
Id. § 102(6)–(7).
See S. REP. NO. 114-32, supra note 126, at 4–5.
CSA, supra note 11, § 102(7)(A).
Id. § 102(7)(B) (emphasis added).
S. REP. NO. 114-32, supra note 126, at 5.
Id.
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authorization to extend to “defensive measures” “that do not cause
substantial harm to another entity’s information systems or data on such
systems, regardless of whether such non-substantial harm was intended or
foreseen by the implementing entity.”144 This seems to imply that
authorization to operate a “defensive measure” would be valid so long as it
does not substantially harm another entity’s system or system data and does
not involve an offensive action such as hacking back into another entity’s
system. But since an entity can operate a “defensive measure” to detect,
prevent, or mitigate “a known or suspected cybersecurity threat,” and since
“cybersecurity threat” is broadly defined, this could lead to “defensive
measure” being broadly construed. Additionally, it is unclear whether
authorization would extend to a “defensive measure” that harms, but does
not substantially harm, another entity’s system or system data.145 It also
remains uncertain what constitutes “substantial harm” and who decides
whether something constitutes a “substantial harm.”146 These are some of
the many questions the CSA leaves unanswered.
Relatedly, “cyber threat indicator” is an important phrase in the CSA
because the CSA authorizes both public and private entities to share and
receive information regarding “cyber threat indicators” with each other.147
The CSA defines “cyber threat indicator” as:
information that is necessary to describe or identify—(A)
malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns of
communications that appear to be transmitted for the purpose of
gathering technical information related to a cybersecurity threat or
security vulnerability; (B) a method of defeating a security control
or exploitation of a security vulnerability; (C) a security
vulnerability, including anomalous activity that appears to
indicate the existence of a security vulnerability; (D) a method of
causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an
information system to unwittingly enable the defeat of a security
control or exploitation of a security vulnerability; (E) malicious
cyber command and control; (F) the actual or potential harm
caused by an incident, including a description of the information
144

Id.
See Gardner & Broder, supra note 112, at 23.
146
See id. (asking “what does it mean for a defensive measure to ‘substantially harm’
information or an information system? Is there some lesser harm that would be permissible,
and who would determine what qualifies as a less-than-substantial harm? Would the key
distinction be whether the defensive measure executes some code on another system, or could
a more ‘passive’ defense, such as blocking access from that system, also constitute
‘substantial harm’?”) (emphasis in original).
147
See S. REP. NO. 114-32, supra note 126, at 4 (“The term ‘cyber threat indicator’ is one
of the most important definitions in [the CSA].”).
145
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exfiltrated as a result of a particular cybersecurity threat; (G) any
other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such
attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law; or (H) any
combination thereof.148
If something does not fall under one of these enumerated categories,
then it is not a “cyber threat indicator” for purposes of the CSA. If something
is a “cyber threat indicator,” however, then private entities can use it to
monitor networks, operate “defensive measures,” or share and receive “cyber
threat indicators” with the federal government149—provided, of course, that
they do it in furtherance of a “cybersecurity purpose.”150 As long as they
comply with this provision, entities will be protected from liability for
sharing “cyber threat indicators” with the federal government or for using
“cyber threat indicators” to monitor networks or operate “defensive
measures.”151 Again, the situations that permit entities to share and receive
“cyber threat indicators” with the government can be construed broadly
because they focus on the same problematic phrases aforementioned—
namely, “cybersecurity purpose” and “cybersecurity threat.” It appears that
Congress intended for “cyber threat indicator” to have a limited definition
by enumerating what information could be shared between and among public
and private entities.152 But some have opined that “cyber threat indicators”
could be interpreted very broadly, similar to the phrases “cybersecurity
threat” and “defensive measure.”153

148

CSA, supra note 11, § 102(6).
The CSA permits entities to share and receive “cyber threat indicators” and “defensive
measures” for a “cybersecurity purpose.” Id. § 104(c).
150
Id. § 104(d)(3)(a).
151
Id. § 106(b).
152
See S. REP. NO. 114-32, supra note 126, at 4 (“This narrow definition is a key privacy
protection in the [CSA] because it creates an exhaustive list of the types of cyber threat
information that can be shared among private and governmental entities, and only when they
are necessary to describe or identify threats to information and information systems.
Essentially, this definition limits the information that can be shared under [the CSA] to the
techniques and ‘malware’ used by malicious actors to compromise the computer networks of
their victims, not sensitive personal and business information contained in such networks.”).
153
See Trevor Ford, Cybersecurity Legislation for an Evolving World, 50 U.S.F. L. REV.
119, 127 (2016) (citing Cyber-Surveillance Bill to Move Forward, Secretly, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 4, 2015), https://cdt.org/insight/cyber-surveillance-bill-to-moveforward-secretly/) (“The [Center for Democracy and Technology] objects to CISA because it
argues that the definition of ‘cyber threat indicators’ (CTIs) is so broad that CISA’s
authorization for the sharing of threat indicators for any purposes other than cybersecurity
risks the facilitation of government surveillance.”); Heidenreich, supra note 132, at 404–05
(stating the definition of “cyber threat indicator” “is too broad to be meaningful,” and because
the definition is so broad, a private entity could share “nearly any piece of information” with
the government).
149
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The legislative history reveals that Congress intended the definition of
a “cybersecurity threat” to encompass activities that could have
“unauthorized and negative results.”154 A “cybersecurity threat,” however,
explicitly excludes any actions that solely involve “violation[s] of a
consumer term of service or a consumer licensing agreement.”155 This
appears to refer to the debate surrounding the CFAA where some circuit
courts have concluded that violations of consumer terms of service or
consumer licensing agreements constitute “exceed[ing] authorized access”
under the CFAA.156 Congress did not want to have a consumer agreement
violation constitute a “cybersecurity threat” under the CSA. “Cybersecurity
threat” does, however, include cyberattacks like the Dyn DDoS attack
because these could have “unauthorized and negative results” like disrupting
service of major websites for millions of people.157 Additionally, as two
scholars point out, a “cybersecurity threat” could also include entities that
unsuspectingly become threats—for example, when a botnet or other
malware overtakes an entity’s systems, as occurred in the Dyn DDoS
attack.158 The CSA does not contemplate what happens if this occurs, and
given the broad definition of “cybersecurity threat,” public and private
entities would presumably be able to monitor and/or operate “defensive
measures” against the infected entity in such a situation. This would give
broad authorization and liability protection to entities for these actions, but
would be unfair to the person whose computer or information system was
overtaken by something that he or she had no control over.
154

S. REP. NO. 114-32, supra note 126, at 4.
CSA, supra note 11, § 102(5)(B).
156
Gardner & Broder, supra note 112, at 22 (“The [CSA] specifically excludes ‘any
action that solely involves a violation of a consumer term of service or a consumer licensing
agreement.’ Removing these types of violations from the definition of ‘cybersecurity threat’
is an apparent nod to the debate surrounding the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)[,
which] has caused a ‘sharp division’ among the circuit courts regarding the appropriate scope
and interpretation of the ‘exceeds authorized access’ provision[.] . . . Some circuits . . . have
interpreted the [CFAA] more broadly and upheld convictions for violations of consumer or
employee terms of service. Accordingly, by defining ‘cybersecurity threat’ as excluding the
violation of a consumer term of service, the [CSA] does not provide carte blanche to private
entities to disclose or monitor information merely because of the relatively common
occurrence of a consumer violating terms of service.”). See also S. REP. NO. 114-32, supra
note 126, at 4 (“Many terms of service agreements prohibit activities that would also meet the
‘cybersecurity threat’ definition; such activities would still be considered a ‘cybersecurity
threat’ because they were not ‘solely’ violations of consumer agreements. The [Select
Committee on Intelligence] intends this definition to include activities that may have
unauthorized and negative results, but to exclude authorized activities, such as extensive use
of bandwidth that may incidentally cause adverse effects. However, this definition clearly
does not permit hackers to cloak their criminal actions like theft of information or destruction
of property under the ambit of First Amendment protected activities.”).
157
S. REP. NO. 114-32, supra note 126, at 4.
158
Gardner & Broder, supra note 112, at 21.
155
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The scope of the CSA depends on how courts interpret “authorization”
under the CSA through construing the phrases “cybersecurity purpose,”
“cybersecurity threat,” “defensive measure,” and “cyber threat indicator.”
Put simply, the CSA defines a “cybersecurity threat” as anything that may
harm a network.159 A lot of things could fall into this broad definition, which
would then cause “cybersecurity purpose,” “defensive measures,” and
“cyber threat indicators” to also be broadly interpreted. The concept of
“authorization” within the CSA matters because whether entities are
protected from liability depends on whether they are complying with the
CSA’s standards—entities are protected from liability only if they are taking
actions prescribed by the CSA for a “cybersecurity purpose,” not other,
potentially nefarious or non-cybersecurity purposes.160 Given the broad
definition of “cybersecurity purpose” and how broadly courts could construe
it, there seems to be little for which entities would be liable. Thus, it is
important for Congress to clarify what these terms mean, as well as define
“unauthorized effort” and “unauthorized access” so the CSA does not
become a broad surveillance law with serious privacy implications.161

159

See supra note 137.
CSA, supra note 11, § 106(b).
161
Under the CSA, the federal government clearly has more authorization to share and
receive “cyber threat indicators” than private entities. See CSA, supra note 11, §§ 103,
105(d)(5). Some believe that this is unfair and that this makes the CSA seem more like a
surveillance bill than a cybersecurity law. See Jessica Beyer, The Cybersecurity Information
Sharing Act (CISA), HENRY M. JACKSON SCH. INT’L STUD., U. WASH. (Oct. 30, 2015),
https://jsis.washington.edu/news/the-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act-cisa/ (“Critics of
the CISA are concerned about four major elements of the bill. First, critics are concerned that
the definitions included in the bill are overly broad. . . . Second, critics are concerned that the
protections for companies are overly vast. . . . Third, critics are concerned about the
surveillance permission granted to U.S. security agencies, in general, beyond the purpose of
the bill. . . . Fourth, critics are concerned that the bill will not do anything to address present
day cybersecurity challenges.”). See also Russell Brandom, Congress snuck a surveillance
bill into the federal budget last night, VERGE (Dec. 16, 2015, 10:51 AM),
http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/16/10288182/cisa-surveillance-cybersecurity-budget-pro
posal (“[The CSA] make[s] it easier for private sector companies to share user information
with the government and other companies, removing privacy and liability protections in the
name of better cybersecurity. . . . In many ways, the [CSA] . . . is even more invasive than
previous versions, stripping out crucial provisions that prevented direct information-sharing
with the NSA and mandated that data be anonymized before being widely distributed. ‘It’s
clear now that this bill was never intended to prevent cyber attacks,’ said Evan Greer,
campaign director of Fight for the Future, which has campaigned vigorously against the bill.
‘It’s a disingenuous attempt to quietly expand the US government’s surveillance programs.’”).
As mentioned, however, a detailed look at the CSA’s privacy implications is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
160
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B. The Unclear Scope of “Authorization” Under the CSA
Key phrases in the CSA are “unauthorized effort” and “unauthorized
access,” neither of which are defined in the CSA, and both of which sound
very similar to the phrases “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized
access” in the CFAA. What constitutes an “unauthorized effort” or
“unauthorized access”? Do these phrases mean the same as “without
authorization” or “exceeds authorized access”? As the CSA is currently
written, it is unclear.
Section 104 of the CSA partially explains “authorization.”
Notwithstanding any other law, section 104 authorizes private entities—for
“cybersecurity purpose[s]” only—to monitor information systems; operate
defensive measures on their own information systems, as well as other
private or government entities’ information systems provided they have the
others’ authorization and written consent; and share or receive “cyber threat
indicators” or “defensive measures.”162 Section 104 explicitly states that
“[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the monitoring
of an information system [or “authorize the use of a defensive measure”] . . .
other than as provided in this subsection[] or to limit otherwise lawful
activity.”163
The legislative history reveals that Congress intended “authorization”
in the CSA to refer to actions undertaken for “cybersecurity purpose[s]”
only.164 Interestingly, the legislative history also reveals that Congress stated
the authorization for entities to take “defensive measures” “does not include
activities that are generally considered ‘offensive’ in nature, such as
unauthorized access of, or execution of computer code on, another entity’s
information systems, . . . or any actions that would substantially harm
another private entity’s information systems, such as violations of [the
CFAA].”165 But there are two problems with this partial explanation of
“authorization” for the CSA. First, this guidance addresses only “defensive
measures,” not monitoring or sharing information, all of which entities can
do, provided it is for a “cybersecurity purpose,” which is itself a broad term,
as explained above. Second, this guidance does not define “unauthorized
access,” but instead references CFAA violations as examples of actions that
would not be authorized by the CSA. Given the current split of interpretation
on what constitutes a CFAA violation with regard to unauthorized actions,
however, this gives minimal (if any) guidance as to the scope of
“authorization” under the CSA. Thus, the CSA’s legislative history does not
162

CSA, supra note 11, § 104(a)–(c).
Id. § 104(a)(2), (b)(2).
164
161 CONG. REC. S8848 (2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2015-1218/pdf/CREC-2015-12-18-pt1-PgS8844.pdf.
165
Id.
163
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elucidate Congress’s intent as to the scope of “authorization” under the Act.
In other words, anything that could result in an “unauthorized effort” would
constitute a “cybersecurity threat.” This would, in turn, constitute a
“cybersecurity purpose,” which would permit entities to take action—i.e.,
monitor networks, operate “defensive measures,” or share and receive “cyber
threat indicators” with the government—pursuant to the CSA and without
fear of reprisal.166 This will inevitably occur because of the broad definitions
of these ambiguous phrases and the lack of clarification as to the scope of
“authorization” under the CSA.
How courts interpret “cybersecurity purpose” is important because this
will determine the scope of “authorization” under the CSA, i.e., the limits on
how entities can monitor information systems, operate defensive measures,
and share and receive “cyber threat indicators.”167 Depending on how
broadly courts interpret “unauthorized effort” and “unauthorized access,”
courts could also broadly interpret “cybersecurity purpose,” “cybersecurity
threat,” “defensive measures,” and “cyber threat indicator.”168 If courts
broadly interpret these troublesome phrases, this could have serious privacy
implications for what entities are legally permitted to do under the CSA,
particularly because as long as the private entity can show its actions were
for a “cybersecurity purpose,” it can take advantage of the liability
protections the CSA affords.169
Senator Ron Wyden opined that the definition of “cybersecurity threat”
in the CSA is too broad and will incentivize sharing information even when
the information is not affiliated with (or even unlikely to relate to) an actual
cybersecurity threat.170 He suggests that Congress should have a more
166

CSA, supra note 11, § 106.
See S. REP. NO. 114-32, supra note 126, at 3.
168
Gardner & Broder, supra note 112, at 26 (citing CSA, supra note 11, §
105(d)(5)(A)(i)).
169
See Johnson, supra note 126, at 580–81 (citing John D. McKinnon, Congress Poised
to Pass Cybersecurity Measure, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/congress-poised-to-pass-cybersecurity-measure-1450284622) (“Critics of the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act contend that the statute grants broad powers of
surveillance and fails to incorporate appropriate privacy protections. Market participants
express concern regarding the government’s ability to safeguard proprietary and confidential
information. Government warehousing of shared data is only as safe as the government’s
capacity to prevent cyber intrusions. After recent cyberattacks breaching government agency
defenses, many express concerns that shared information may be more vulnerable in the hands
of government agencies.”).
170
S. REP. NO. 114-32, supra note 126, at 21 (Senator Ron Wyden stated “I opposed this
bill because I believe its insufficient privacy protections will lead to large amounts of personal
information being shared with the government even when that information is not needed for
cybersecurity. This could include email content, financial records, and a wide variety of other
personal information. . . . This excessively broad collection may not be the intent of this bill,
but the language is clearly drafted broadly enough to permit it. Most notably, the bill defines
a cybersecurity threat as anything that ‘may result’ in harm to a network. This broad definition
167
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narrowly focused definition of a “cybersecurity threat”—limited to actions
that are “reasonably likely” to affect or harm a network—to ensure that
information-sharing is tailored to actual threats.171 Senator Wyden stated
that the CSA’s language as a whole permits an “excessively broad”
collection of information.172 Thus, he opposed the CSA because he said the
bill does very little to secure America’s networks, yet significantly increases
the government’s collection of people’s personal and private information.173
This Comment similarly argues that Congress should amend the CSA to not
only clarify and tailor the definition and/or scope of “cybersecurity threat,”
but also to define the ambiguous phrases “unauthorized effort” and
“unauthorized access” on which the scope of “cybersecurity threat” relies.174
C. Congress Should Amend the CSA, but Absent Any Amendments,
Courts Should Follow the Narrow Interpretation of
“Authorization” Used by the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit
Courts
As noted above, Congress should amend the CSA to clarify its
ambiguous language. Absent any amendments, however, courts should
follow the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits’ lead and interpret
“authorization” in the CSA narrowly. As previously stated, “cybersecurity
purpose” and “cybersecurity threat” both have broad definitions, which form
the basis of authorization for what entities are permitted to do under the CSA.
Entities receive liability protections under the CSA so long as they are
undertaking actions for a “cybersecurity purpose,” which is meant to protect
against cybersecurity threats or anything that could harm an information
system.175 This broad definition can include conduct that does not actually
lead to any harm, as well as actions that are maliciously or unknowingly
harmful (such as a botnet attack that overtakes someone else’s computer and
then uses that computer to harm others).
Scholar Orin Kerr argues that courts should not adopt “contract-based
notions of authorization,” but rather should limit statutes involving
unauthorized access to cases that involve the “circumvention of code-based
restrictions.”176 Analogous to the narrower interpretation side of the CFAA
will incentivize the sharing of information even when it is unlikely to pertain to an actual
cybersecurity threat. A more tailored definition, limited to actions that are reasonably likely
to harm or interfere with a network, would ensure that information-sharing is more narrowly
focused on actual threats.”).
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 22.
174
CSA, supra note 11, §§ 102(5), 203.
175
See id. § 102(4)–(5).
176
Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
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circuit split, Kerr states that simply violating a contractual restriction on
computer use should not constitute unauthorized access.177 Kerr contends
that bypassing code-based restrictions, such as password protections, should
be required to trigger criminal liability, “such that hacking into a computer
could be an unauthorized access, but violating Terms of Service would not
be.”178
This Comment similarly argues that courts should not interpret
“authorization” in the CSA to mean violating restrictions on use of
information,179 but rather should be limited to violating restrictions on access
to information.180 The legislative history of the CSA implies that it was not
necessarily enacted to prevent restrictions on use, but rather was enacted to
prevent actions “including cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches.”181 As
noted above, the CSA permits entities to monitor networks, operate
“defensive measures,” and share and receive “cyber threat indicators” as
long as these actions are taken for a “cybersecurity purpose.” This is to
protect information or information systems from a “cybersecurity threat,”
which is anything that may result in an “unauthorized effort.”182 A broad
interpretation of “authorization” under the CSA would lead to broad
interpretations of “cybersecurity purpose,” “cybersecurity threat,”
“defensive measure,” and “cyber threat indicator.” The scope of “defensive
measure” and “cyber threat indicator” depends on how broadly courts
interpret “cybersecurity purpose.” This depends on how broadly courts
interpret “cybersecurity threat,” which rests on how courts interpret
“unauthorized effort.” If courts construe “authorization” under the CSA
broadly, then violations of use restrictions or misappropriation of
information would constitute “unauthorized efforts.” These violations
would thus constitute “cybersecurity threats” for which entities could
monitor their networks, operate “defensive measures,” or share or receive
“cyber threat indicators.” This expansive interpretation contradicts
Congress’s intent for the CSA to promote voluntary sharing of information
to prevent things like “cyber attacks, theft, and data breaches.”183 Therefore,
courts should instead interpret the concept of authorization under the CSA
narrowly, following the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits on that side of
the CFAA circuit split. They should interpret “unauthorized effort” as a
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1600 (2003).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012).
180
See id.
181
S. REP. No. 114-32, supra note 126, at 15.
182
See supra Part III.B.
183
See S. REP. No. 114-32, supra note 126, at 15; House of Representatives, supra note
116.
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violation of a restriction against access to information, i.e., accessing or
attempting to access information one does not have permission to obtain on
a device that one is otherwise permitted to use. Otherwise, this could create
potential liability for millions of people who might unknowingly become a
“cybersecurity threat” or “cyber threat indicator.”
The scope of CSA provisions containing the following phrases—
”cybersecurity purpose,” “cybersecurity threat,” “defensive measure,” and
“cyber threat indicator”—depends on how courts interpret “unauthorized” or
“authorization.” Recall that a cybersecurity threat is anything that may result
in an unauthorized effort to harm information or information systems.184 The
concept of “authorization” underlying the CSA’s ambiguous phrases
“cybersecurity purpose” and “cybersecurity threat” could be interpreted both
broadly (based on the broad definitions of those phrases) and narrowly (if
courts so choose in their discretion). This Comment argues that if Congress
does not amend the CSA, courts construing its ambiguous language will
inevitably arrive at different interpretations, which could result in a circuit
split similar to the one that exists with the CFAA. This would also cause
entities attempting to address cybersecurity threats to dissimilarly use and
apply the CSA. Some entities will be allowed to more closely monitor
information systems than other entities for things that may result in an
“unauthorized effort” to harm information or information systems. The
potential harm of a non-uniform application of the CSA is that entities in
jurisdictions where courts broadly interpret the CSA’s ambiguous language
will be able to do more monitoring, employ more “defensive measures,” or
share and receive more “cyber threat indicators” than entities in jurisdictions
where courts narrowly interpret the CSA’s language—all while being
shielded by the CSA’s liability protections. This will not only lead to a
circuit split similar to the CFAA’s, but will also have serious privacy
implications and could lead to constitutional challenges in the near future.185
IV. THE CSA SHOULD BE AMENDED RATHER THAN REPEALED
Some critics of the CSA would prefer to repeal and replace the CSA
rather than amend it, because of the difficulties in amending federal
legislation.186 The United States Constitution sets forth specific procedural
requirements for creating binding federal legislation.187 Under this
184

See CSA, supra note 11, § 102(4)–(5).
See supra note 132.
186
See, e.g., Daniel Wilson, Voices Grow Against ‘Hastily’ Passed Cybersecurity Law,
LAW360 (Jan. 26, 2016, 2:46 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/750690/voices-growagainst-hastily-passed-cybersecurity-law; Cory Bennett, Amash Bill Would Repeal New
Cybersecurity Law, THE HILL (Jan. 14, 2016, 9:08 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/
cybersecurity/265852-amash-bill-would-repeal-new-cybersecurity-law.
187
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
185
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framework, a bill becomes law after a majority in both the House and the
Senate pass it, and after the President signs it.188 This process “makes federal
legislation exceedingly difficult to enact and to amend.”189 On January 28,
2016, shortly after Congress passed the CSA, Republican House
Representative Justin Amash introduced a bill to repeal the CSA,190 stating
it was “the worst anti-privacy law since the USA Patriot Act.”191
Congressman Amash claimed that most representatives likely did not even
vote on the CSA because they did not notice it being included as part of such
an omnibus bill.192 Civil liberties advocates, government accountability
groups, and tech industry members similarly expressed a strong desire to
repeal the CSA, arguing “it was ‘hastily’ included in a broader government
funding bill and deserves open debate.”193 These groups also believe that the
CSA likely will not prevent cyberattacks and, rather, will allow for “broad
and undefined data collection”194 in contravention of privacy rights.195
188
Id. § 7, cl. 2. See also Michael D. Shumsky, Severability, Inseverability, and the Rule
of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 247 (2004) (describing the “arduous legislative process”
in America for how a bill becomes “a legally binding statutory enactment subject only to
substantive constitutional constraints”).
189
Shumsky, supra note 188, at 264.
190
See To Repeal the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, H.R. 4350, (114th Cong. Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4350/text.
191
Bennett, supra note 186.
192
See id.
193
Wilson, supra note 186; Sam Thielman, Apple, Google and Twitter among 22 tech
companies opposing Cisa bill, GUARDIAN (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/oct/21/apple-google-and-twitter-among-22-tech-companies-opposing-cisabill (“Twenty-two of the world’s top technology companies are firmly against the
controversial Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act . . . [including] Apple, Google, Twitter
and Wikipedia[.] . . . [CISA] is aimed at tightening online security but has been criticised as
infringing on civil liberties and privacy. . . . The bill would allow private industry to share
user information with the Department of Homeland Security, which would be compelled to
share it across ‘relevant government agencies’, presumably including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA). The bill has been touted by its
supporters, notably the US Chamber of Commerce, as entirely voluntary, but in fact, as Wired
points out, other such ‘voluntary’ programs mandate the kind of data reported and the
frequency of the reports.”). See also Heidenreich, supra note 132, at 407 (citing Tom
Risen, Obama Signs Cybersecurity Law In Spending Package, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REP. (Dec. 18, 2015, 5:49 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015-12-18/obamasigns-cybersecurity-law-in-spending-package) (“This change in standards is one reason that
some privacy experts and some legislators are upset about the fact that CISA was tacked on
to the budget bill and passed with no real debate.”).
194
Wilson, supra note 186. See also Heidenreich, supra note 132, at 410 (“The
information that CISA authorizes the government to collect is too broad. There are too few
controls on what information the government collects and on how it uses that information. In
fact, CISA specifically authorizes the government to use the information for noncybersecurity purposes. The information is collected without a warrant or probable cause, yet
CISA authorizes the government to use that information in order to prosecute certain
crimes.”).
195
Wilson, supra note 186. See also Tran, supra note 112, at 497 (“[S]haring information
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Others have argued that the CSA’s information-sharing framework creates
new opportunities for would-be cyber attackers.196
If Congress amends the CSA to clarify the meaning and scope of
“authorization” as it relates to “cybersecurity purpose,” “cybersecurity
threat,” “defensive measure,” and “cyber threat indicator,” this would
eliminate the need for a possible repeal. Additionally, amending the CSA
would quell some of the privacy advocates’ fears about the government
having too much power to collect and/or share information under the guise
of a “cybersecurity purpose” or “cybersecurity threat” because it would
ideally narrow and limit the potential scope of its ambiguous provisions, as
well as give legislators the chance to debate these provisions.
V. STATE CYBERSECURITY LAWS INVOLVING “AUTHORIZATION”
A number of state legislatures have passed cybersecurity laws.197
Solely with regard to online privacy and data security, states have enacted
statutes covering a wide array of issues.198 A detailed examination of all of
these state cybersecurity laws is beyond the scope of this Comment. This
section will, however, briefly discuss some of these state cybersecurity laws
that define concepts related to authorization as an example of the kind of
language Congress could use to amend the CSA to clarify its ambiguous
language centered on the concept of “authorization.”

does little to prevent successful cyberattacks, given that there have been many already in
place. For instance, in 2003, DHS established its U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
to collect and analyze data, but its results have been unclear. . . . [The CSA] will very likely
face constitutional challenges in courts; the battle of right to privacy in the realm of
cybersecurity is far from over.”).
196
See Tran, supra note 112, at 497.
197
See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, Cybersecurity Legislation
2016, Dec. 8, 2016, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/cybersecurity-legislation-2016.aspx (summarizing state cybersecurity laws that
were proposed (and in some cases, enacted) in 2016); National Conference of State
Legislatures, Cybersecurity Legislation 2015, Dec. 31, 2015, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/cybersecurity-legislation-2015.aspx
(summarizing state cybersecurity laws that were proposed (and in some cases, enacted) in
2015).
198
Examples of such issues include cyberstalking, privacy-related issues, privacy
policies, employer access to employees’ social media accounts, unsolicited commercial
communications, data disposal, electronic solicitation of children, and security breach
notifications, to name a few. Alan Charles Raul, Tasha D. Manoranjan, & Vivek K. Mohan,
United States, in THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW 268,
279 (Alan Charles Raul ed., 2014), http://www.sidley.com/~/media/files/publications/
2014/11/the-privacy-data-protection-and-cybersecurity-la__/files/united-states/fileattachmen
t/united-states.pdf (internal citations omitted). For state cybersecurity laws that have been
enacted in 2016, see National Conference of State Legislatures, Cybersecurity Legislation
2016, Oct. 27, 2016, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/cybersecurity-legislation-2016.aspx.
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For instance, New York’s penal code states that “[a] person is guilty of
unauthorized use of a computer when he or she knowingly uses, causes to be
used, or accesses a computer, computer service, or computer network
without authorization.”199 Unlike the CFAA, the New York law defines
“without authorization.”200 It states that “without authorization” means “to
use or to access a computer, computer service or computer network without
the permission of the owner or lessor or someone licensed or privileged by
the owner or lessor”201 and “where such person knew that his or her use or
access was without permission or after actual notice to such person that such
use or access was without permission.”202 The law further provides that
proof that a person accessed or used “a computer, computer service or
computer network through the knowing use of a set of instructions, code or
computer program that bypasses, defrauds or otherwise circumvents a
security measure installed . . . shall be presumptive evidence that such
person used or accessed [such a device or network] . . . without
authorization.”203
Similar to New York, Colorado also defines “authorization” in its penal
code as “the express consent of a person which may include an employee’s
job description to use said person’s computer, computer network, computer
program, computer software, computer system, property, or services as those
terms are defined in this section.”204 Similar to the CFAA, Colorado defines
“exceed authorized access” as “to access a computer with authorization and
to use such access to obtain or alter information, data, computer program, or
computer software that the person is not entitled to so obtain or alter.”205
Virginia’s Computer Crimes Act also discusses authorization.206 It
states that “[a] person is ‘without authority’ when he knows or reasonably
should know that he has no right, agreement, or permission or acts in a
manner knowingly exceeding such right, agreement, or permission.”207

199

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (McKinney 2006). But see MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §
7-302 (West 2010) (a law discussing unauthorized access to computers but not defining
“unauthorized access”).
200
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.00(8).
201
Id.
202
Id. See also id. (further stating that without authorization “shall also mean the access
of a computer service by a person without permission where such person knew that such
access was without permission or after actual notice to such person, that such access was
without permission”).
203
Id.
204
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-5.5-101(1) (West 2000).
205
Id. § 18-5.5-101(6.7).
206
See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.2 (West 2010).
207
Id.
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More recently, in 2016, Utah adopted a cybersecurity law with
provisions related to “unauthorized access” to information technology,
specifically unauthorized access of a protected computer.208 Like the CFAA,
the Utah law includes the term “protected computer,” which it defines as “a
computer that is used in connection with the operation of a business, state
government entity, or political subdivision and requires a technological
access barrier for an individual to access the computer.”209 To help
determine what constitutes unauthorized access, the law defines “authorized
user” as “the protected computer’s owner; or an individual who has
permission to access the protected computer[.]”210 The law also defines
“unauthorized user” as an individual who “is not an authorized user of the
protected computer; and accesses the protected computer by: obtaining,
without an authorized user’s permission, the authorized user’s technological
access barrier; or circumventing, without the permission of the protected
computer’s owner, a technological access barrier on the protected
computer.”211 The law prohibits unauthorized users from knowingly and
intentionally causing harm or damage by obtaining information from a
protected computer; transmitting “a program, code, or command to the
protected computer;” or using a “technological access barrier” to access the
protected computer.212 By defining which computers this law applies to and
what constitutes authorized and unauthorized users, the Utah law is more
narrow and limited in application than the CFAA or the CSA.
Congress should amend the CSA to both provide a clear definition of
“authorization” and limit the scope of “authorization” in the CSA, similar to
what is found in these state statutes. A clear and limiting definition of
“authorization” is necessary because other critical phrases in the CSA
depend on how the phrases “unauthorized effort” and “unauthorized access”
are defined and interpreted. As these phrases stand now, courts could
broadly interpret these provisions and provisions that rely on these phrases,
so an amendment is necessary to narrow the scope of “authorization” in the
CSA. For example, Congress could define “unauthorized effort” as
something akin to Utah’s definition of “unauthorized access,” New York’s
definition of “without authorization,” or Virginia’s definition of “without
authority.”213 The specificity in these definitions would limit the scope of
208
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63D-3-101–06 (2016), http://le.utah.gov/~2016/bills/
static/hb0241.html. See also National Conference of State Legislatures, Cybersecurity
Legislation 2016, Dec. 8, 2016, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation-technology/cybersecurity-legislation-2016.aspx.
209
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63D-3-101–06(a).
210
Id. § 63D-3-102(1).
211
Id. § 63D-3-102(9).
212
Id. § 63D-3-104(1).
213
See id. § 63D-3-102(9); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.2; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.00(8).
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“authorization” in the CSA, thus making the courts’ task of interpreting the
CSA much easier. Congress could also add a definition of a computer or
information system that the CSA applies to in order to further limit the
application of the CSA so that it applies to specific devices rather than just
any computer or electronic device that could connect to the Internet and pose
a “cybersecurity threat.” Congress could also include examples of what it
means by “unauthorized effort” or a “cybersecurity threat,” which could give
more context to the intended scope of authorization in the CSA. By
amending the CSA to incorporate a definition of authorization or examples
of unauthorized efforts and cybersecurity threats, Congress could guide
courts in interpreting the CSA when questions of liability, monitoring,
operating “defensive measures,” information sharing, and privacy problems
inevitably arise.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps Congress intended the ambiguities in the CSA. Or, perhaps
Congress inadvertently included the ambiguities. Either way, ambiguous
language exists with respect to the concept of authorization in the CSA,
which will create interpretive problems for the judiciary and will have large
privacy and security implications if it is not amended, or interpreted narrowly
in the absence of any amendments. This Comment recommends that
Congress amend the CSA to clarify its scope of authorization, which impacts
how courts will interpret “cybersecurity purpose,” “cybersecurity threat,”
“defensive measure,” and “cyber threat indicator” under the CSA when
questions of liability, monitoring, operating “defensive measures,”
information sharing, and privacy problems inevitably arise.
This
clarification would help guide courts in interpreting the CSA and help
prevent a potential circuit split of interpretation down the road, similar to that
which currently exists with the CFAA. In the absence of any amendments
(or a Supreme Court resolution of the CFAA circuit split), however, courts
should narrowly interpret the CSA’s provisions centering around the concept
of authorization, just as the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have done in
the CFAA context.

